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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MONICA GILLETT, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
V •
 t 
JAMES ANTHONY GILLETT, | 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
CASE NO. 880413-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 146 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, a New York resident, filed an action in Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah to enforce the terms of a 
non-judicial Separation Agreement entered into by the parties in 
1970 and amended by the parties in 1977. This appeal stems from 
the trial court granting Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
of the trial court's earlier denial of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment pursuant to the Motion for Reconsideration. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
There are no determinative statutes, constitutional 
provisions or ordinances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, Monica Gillett ("Ms. Gillett"), 
and Defendant/Appellant, James Anthony Gillett ("Dr. Gillett"), 
were married on May 7, 1938 in Banstead, England. There were 
four children as issue of the marriage. (R: pg 13) Dr. Gillett 
is a medical doctor. His career led the parties to live in 
Australia during a portion of the marriage, and to change their 
residences frequently throughout the marriage, making it 
impossible for Ms. Gillett to pursue a career during the 
marriage. Additionally, Dr. Gillettfs medical career limited 
the time which he spent with his children, leaving Ms. Gillett 
with the full responsibility to provide a home for the family. 
After thirty-two years of marriage, Dr. Gillett, a 
psychiatrist, became romantically involved with one of his 
patients and wished to divorce his wife in order to marry his 
patient. (R: pg 75-76) Ms. Gillett, without any marketable 
skills, and with no work experience, feared that Dr. Gillett 
would lose his medical license if his involvement with a patient 
became public knowledge. Accordingly, when Dr. Gillett 
approached her with a demand for a Mexican divorce, to circumvent 
the year-long waiting period then required by New York law, Ms. 
Gillett agreed. She never consulted counsel before signing a 
Separation Agreement dated March 31, 1970; neither did she 
consult an attorney before agreeing that Dr. Gillett could take a 
Mexican divorce against her. (R: pg. 75-76) 
On March 31, 1970, the parties entered into a Separation 
Agreement, which was drafted by Dr. Gillettfs counsel, and which 
was not reviewed by anyone representing Ms. Gillett!s interests. 
(R: pg 13-17, 75-76) Both parties were residents of Fulton, New 
York when the original Separation Agreement was signed, and both 
signed it in Oswego, New York. (R: pg 17) The Separation 
Agreement provided, in pertinent parts: 
1. Dr. Gillett shall pay Ms. Gillett $650 a month, payable 
on the first day of each month, and shall, in addition, 
pay the monthly rental on Ms. Gillettfs residence. 
2. Dr. Gillett shall continue the life insurance policies 
on his own life, shall pay the premiums on those 
policies and shall continue to maintain Ms. Gillett as 
beneficiary on those polices. 
3. Should the parties divorce, the Separation Agreement 
should not be merged into the Decree of Divorce, but 
should survive the Decree, and "be forever binding and 
conclusive on the parties,...11 (R: pg 15-16) 
The parties were divorced in Juarez, Mexico on April 28, 
1970. The Separation Agreement was incorporated into the Decree 
of Divorce, but was not merged with it. (R: pg 11-12) 
Dr. Gillett fell into arrears in his support obligations for 
the period January 1, 1973 to July 1, 1975, forcing Ms. Gillett 
to bring an action against him in the Supreme Court, Onondaga 
County, State of New York on or about July 22, 1975. (R: pg 18-
19) In settlement of that action, the parties, though their 
counsel, amended the Separation Agreement in open court on 
September 20, 1911. Subsequently, the parties executed an 
Amended Separation Agreement dated September 23, 1977, in which 
they modified the fifth paragraph of the Separation Agreement to 
fix Dr. Gillett!s support obligation at $800 each month. In the 
Amended Separation Agreement, the parties "reiterate, reallege 
and reaffirm all the agreements as previously set out in the 
Separation Agreement dated the 31st day of March, 1970." The 
Amended Separation Agreement did not provide that the Decree of 
Divorce be modified in accordance with its provisions. (R: pg 18-
19) The Decree remains unaltered. Neither the Decree of 
Divorce, the Separation Agreement, nor the Amended Separation 
Agreement was ever incorporated into a judgment or order of an 
American court. 
Dr. Gillett made support payments to Ms. Gillett in 
accordance with the Amended Separation Agreement for eight years. 
Then, in May 1985, Dr. Gillett decreased his payment from the 
agreed-upon $800 each month to $400. He paid $540 in June, $800 
in July, and from August 1985 through August 1986, paid $650 a 
month in support. (R: pg 21-22, 53-54) After Ms. Gillett filed 
this action to recover the arrearages owed her in late August 
1986, Dr. Gillett refused to make any payments to her. (R: pg 
126-127) 
Dr. Gillett has never argued that the Amended Separation 
Agreement provides justification for his refusal to make the 
required payments to Ms. Gillett. Neither has he suggested that 
there is a change in his circumstances which renders it 
difficult, impossible, or unjust for him to continue the payments 
to Ms. Gillett. Certainly, Dr. Gillett has not availed himself 
of his opportunity under New York law to attempt to have his 
support obligation reduced. Apparently, he just decided that he 
had paid enough, and that he would relieve himself of the 
obligation to continue to support the woman who had been his wife 
for thirty-two years, and who had borne him four children. 
When nonjudicial attempts to convince Dr. Gillett to resume 
full payments under the Amended Separation Agreement failed, Ms. 
Gillett filled an action in the Third District Court seeking a 
judgment for the amount of arrearages and an order of specific 
performance of the Amended Separation Agreement. (R: pg 2-22) On 
November 21, 1986, Ms. Gillett moved for summary judgment. (R: pg 
29, 31-56) While Dr. Gillett never filed a responsive pleading, 
he did have a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment delivered to Ms. Gillett!s counsel shortly before the 
scheduled hearing on the Motion. On October 31, 1988, Dr. 
Gillett had his Memorandum in Opposition inserted into the Record 
of this case. (R: No page numbers, located at end of Volume I of 
the Record) 
The Court heard arguments on Ms. Gillettfs Motion on 
December 15, 1986. During the course of oral argument, counsel 
for Ms. Gillett erroneously informed the Court that her client 
had been represented by counsel when the Separation Agreement was 
negotiated and drafted. (Trans: pg 10) 
After hearing argument, the Court ruled in a Minute Entry 
dated December 17, 1986, that "There does appear to be an 
ambiguity in the agreement concerning the duration of the 
obligation to pay plaintiff..." (R: pg 59) The Court's Order 
denying Ms. Gillett's Motion for Summary Judgment was entered 
January 20, 1987. (R: pg 60-61) 
During much of 1987, the parties attempted to negotiate a 
settlement of the controversy. Ms. Gillett propounded discovery 
to Dr. Gillett, which was never answered. (R: pg 99) 
On October 19, 1987, Ms. Gillett sought a reconsideration of 
the Court's earlier denial of her Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R: pg 71-76) Counsel had learned that Ms. Gillett had not been 
represented by counsel at the time that the Separation Agreement 
was negotiated, drafted, and signed. Counsel was informed that 
Ms. Gillett had been terrified at the time of the divorce that 
Dr. Gillett's involvement with his patient would become public 
knowledge, and that Dr. Gillett would lose his license to 
practice medicine. Counsel discovered that Ms. Gillett wished 
only to have the divorce taken as quietly as possible to protect 
herself and her two college-age children who were dependent upon 
Dr. Gillett for support. 
Knowing that ambiguities are to be interpreted against the 
party drafting a contract, Ms. Gillett's counsel believed that 
the Court had been misled during oral argument by her assertion 
that Ms. Gillett had been represented by counsel when the 
Separation Agreement was drafted. Therefore, counsel determined 
to seek the Court's reconsideration of its earlier decision. 
Ms. Gillett filed her Motion to Reconsider on October 19, 
1987. The Motion was heard on November 30, 1987, and was taken 
under advisement. On December 1, 1987, the Court held in its 
Minute Entry that: 
"upon review of the file and supporting 
affidavits the Court determines that it did 
in fact err in denying Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. A re-reading of the 
Separation Agreement convinces the Court that 
no ambiguity exists..." (R: pg 101) 
(Emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the Court reversed its earlier ruling, and granted 
Ms. Gillett's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court mailed its Minute Entry to counsel on December 10, 
1987. Ms. Gillett submitted her proposed Judgment and Order on 
December 18, 1987, which Judgment and Order were signed and 
entered by the Court on December 29, 1987. (R: pg 117-118) 
Prior to her submission of the proposed Judgment and Order, 
counsel for Ms. Gillett telephoned counsel for Dr. Gillett, and 
asked him to contact her if he believed that she had made a 
computational error in determining the amount of arrearages owed 
by his client. Counsel never contacted Ms. Gillett's counsel 
concerning the calculation of arrearages. (R: pg 12 3-124) 
Rather, Dr. Gillett filed an Objection to the Proposed Findings 
and Order and Motion for Amendment of Judgment or Relief from the 
Order on December 23, 1987. (R: pg 103-116) In his Motion for 
Amendment or Relief, Dr. Gillett for the first time raised the 
defense that he had made payments to Ms. Gillett in 1970-1973 in 
addition to those required under the Separation Agreement, and 
that he was entitled to credit for those payments. 
The Court heard argument on Dr. Gillett!s Objection and 
Motion, and denied both. (R: pg 140) The Court gave Ms. Gillett 
leave to file an Amended Judgment and Order, which was signed and 
entered by the Court on May 16, 1988. (R: pg 143-144) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. While Ms. Gillett concedes that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not specifically provide for a Motion to Reconsider, 
the Court may change a ruling until a final judgment on the case 
is rendered. 
2. The Separation Agreement and the Amended Separation 
Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with New York law, in 
that the parties entered into the Separation Agreement in New 
York State, stipulated in a New York Court to the modifications 
set forth in the Amended Separation Agreement, and the 
beneficiary of the Separation Agreement has at all times remained 
a resident of New York State, providing New York with the most 
substantial interest in the contract. Nevertheless, since Utah 
law and New York law are substantially similar with respect to 
the legal issues here presented, the Court's decision would be 
the same whether New York or Utah law applies. 
3. There was no ambiguity in the Separation Agreement or 
Amended Separation Agreement under either New York or Utah law. 
4. Under New York law, the Separation Agreement and 
Amended Separation Agreement are enforceable, and cannot be set 
aside unless unconscionable. The facts on the record do not 
demonstrate that these Agreements were unconscionable at the time 
they were executed, nor that enforcement now would work a 
hardship on Dr. Gillett. 
5. Dr. Gillett has failed to justify his failure to pay 
alimony to Ms. Gillett by any interpretation of the so-called 
"ambiguous" portions of the Separation Agreement. 
6. Dr. Gillett is not entitled to credit against his 
arrearages for payments he allegedly made to Ms. Gillett in 1970 
through 1973. 
7. Dr. Gillett has appealed the decision of the trial 
court only to delay, and has failed to raise any valid legal 
claims. Accordingly, Ms. Gillett should be awarded her fees and 
costs. 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
I. WHEN THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT IT ERRED, IT MAY 
CHANGE ITS RULING UNTIL A FINAL JUDGMENT IS ENTERED. 
Dr. Gillett argues that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do 
not provide for a Motion to Reconsider. Ms. Gillett concedes 
that Dr. Gillett is correct that the Rules do not explicitly 
identify such a procedure. Neither do the Rules identify a 
Motion for Extension of Time, Motion for Leave to Withdraw, or 
any of the other Motions which attorneys propound on behalf of 
their clients each day. 
The denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment is interlocutory 
in nature; it cannot be appealed. See, for example, All Weather 
Insulation, Inc. v. Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176, 1177 
(Utah 1985); Marathon Steel Company v. Placers, Inc., 692 P.2d 
765, 768 (Utah 1985); Little v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918, 919 (Utah 
1979) . Under Utah law, "any judge is free to change his or her 
mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered." Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757,760 (Utah 1985). As 
a general rule, courts do follow "the law of the case", to avoid 
delay. But the doctrine of the "law of the case" exists to serve 
"the interests of economy of time and efficiency of procedure..." 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). 
In this case, the Court, "convinced" that "it did in fact 
err in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment," served 
the interest of judicial economy by reversing itself. Believing 
that there was no issue of material fact existing, the Court 
could not justify holding a trial to hear testimony which could 
have no relevance to its decision. For the Court of Appeals to 
compel a trial judge to try a case for no purpose is absurd, and 
a waste of the judicial resources of the State of Utah. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like the Utah Rules, 
do not explicitly provide for a Motion to Reconsider, yet the 
federal courts may, either upon motion or sua sponte, reconsider 
10 
denials of a summary judgment at any time. See, for example, 
Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation, 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 
1979) ; Warner Brothers v. American Broadcasting Company, Inc. , 
720 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1983). In this case, after the Court 
learned that Ms. Gillett was not represented by counsel at the 
time she executed the Separation Agreement, and after review of 
the relevant law of both New York State and Utah, which 
terminates the obligation for the payment of alimony upon the 
death of either party or the remarriage of the payee, the Court 
determined that it had erred. It must be permitted to correct 
such errors when given new information or additional legal 
precedence. Any other rule would unacceptably limit a trial 
court's discretion. 
In addition, it is clear that Rules 54(b), 59 and 60 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit a Court, under certain 
circumstances, to "reconsider" its earlier decision, and to 
reverse it, even after a final order has been entered. It is 
illogical to deny the Court the right to do the same thing when 
an order is interlocutory in nature and those Rules are not 
applicable. 
II. THE COURT MUST APPLY NEW YORK LAW IN INTERPRETING THE 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND ITS AMENDMENTS. 
Dr. Gillett claims that Utah law, not New York law, governs 
the interpretation of the Separation Agreement and Amended 
Separation Agreement. He is absolutely wrong. Utah courts apply 
the lex loci contractus rule, and look to the law of the place of 
making the contract in interpreting it. Chevron Chemical Co. v. 
Mecham, 536 F.Supp. 1036, 1040 (D. Utah 1982). In this case, the 
Separation Agreement was made and executed in New York. The 
parties stipulated to the Amended Separation Agreement in a New 
York Court. Ms. Gillett executed that document in New York, 
which Dr. Gillett executed it in Washington. Clearly, under Utah 
choice of law principles, New York law governs the Agreements. 
However, even if the Court were to adopt the position set 
forth in Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws, it would reach the 
same result. Section 188 states that the rights and duties of 
the parties are determined by the local law of the state with the 
most significant relationship to the transaction, and the Courts 
should consider the following in identifying that state: 
(a) place of contracting 
(b) place of negotiation 
(c) place of performance 
In this case, the Agreements were negotiated and made in New 
York. The real property which the Separation Agreement 
distributed was located in New York State. The purpose of the 
alimony provision of the Agreements, to provide Ms. Gillett with 
a dependable income and to keep her from becoming a public 
charge. Indeed, if Ms. Gillett were to become a public charge, 
it is New York taxpayers who would have to support her. The 
Court therefore should apply New York law. 
However, even if the Court were to apply Utah law, the 
result would be the same. New York and Utah law are 
substantially identical with respect to the matters at issue. 
III. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
AMBIGUITY IN THE AMENDED SEPARATION AGREEMENT. 
Dr. Gillett has argued that The Separation Agreement and 
Amended Separation Agreement are ambiguous, in that neither sets 
forth specific duration for Dr. Gillett's obligation to pay 
support to Ms. Gillett. Dr. Gillett is in error for numerous 
reasons. 
The language of the Separation Agreement, which was 
reaffirmed in the Amended Separation Agreement, states that: 
"the parties hereto agree that they shall be 
bound by all the terms of this agreement and 
that this agreement shall not be merged in 
any decree or judgment that may be granted in 
such (divorce) action but shall survive the 
same and shall be forever binding and 
conclusive on the parties..." (R: pg 15-16) 
The Agreements do not state that they are binding on either 
parties1 heirs, assigns, and the like. It is obvious from the 
language of the documents that they are to terminate upon the 
death of either party. 
Further demonstrating the fact that the Separation Agreement 
was designed to provide support for Ms. Gillett for the duration 
of her life, without charge to Dr. Gillett's estate, is the fact 
that Dr. Gillett is required under the terms of the Separation 
Agreement to continue Ms. Gillett as beneficiary of his life 
insurance policies. 
Under both New York and Utah law, ambiguity in a contract is 
not established simply because the parties disagree about the 
meaning of the contract. The intent of the parties is to be 
ascertained, if possible, from the content of the document 
itself. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 
570 F.Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 
1060 (Utah 1981). Here, both the language and the provisions of 
the Agreements spell out the intent of both parties at the time 
the documents were executed. Both parties agreed to a scheme 
that would provide Ms. Gillett, nearly fifty-five years old and 
without employment experience or skills, with some financial 
security for the remainder of her life, unless she remarried. 
Even if the Agreements themselves did not clearly spell out 
the duration of Dr. Gillett1s support obligation, both New York 
and Utah law provide that the obligation to pay alimony 
terminates upon death of either party or remarriage of the 
recipient spouse. Cohen v. Cronin, 382 N.Y.S.2d 724,726 (1976) 
("well-accepted proposition that husband's obligation to support 
terminates with death11); Perry v. Perry, 444 N.Y.S.2d 490,491 
(App.Div.3rd Dept. 1981); Chiarmonte v. Chiarmonte, 435 N.Y.S.2d 
523 (S.Ct., Nassau Co. 1981); In the Estate of Donahue, 357 
N.Y.S.2d 777,782 (Sur.Ct.N.Y.Co. 1974); Gandelman v. Gandelman, 
331 N.Y.S.2d 977 (App.Div.2d Dept. 1972); Ehrler v. Ehrler, 328 
N.Y.S.2d 728 (S.Ct., Nassau Co. 1972); New York Domestic 
Relations Law, Section 236B(1)(a); Utah Code Annotated, Section 
30-3-5(5). 
Even assuming that the Agreements were ambiguous, and that 
the law did not "fill in the blanks", the Court was still correct 
in granting summary judgment for Ms. Gillett. Under both New 
York and Utah law, a contract should be construed against its 
maker. This rule of contract interpretation is particularly 
persuasive when, as in this situation, the other party was not 
represented by counsel. Jacobsen v. Sassower, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 
(1985); Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 
P.2d 918 (Utah 1982). 
Finally, even if the Agreements were ambiguous, and even if 
that alleged ambiguity were not to be construed against Dr. 
Gillett, Dr. Gillett is barred from claiming a defect in the 
Agreements. Under New York law, "a party to a separation 
agreement may not attack the validity of the agreement 
collaterally after it has been incorporated into a valid, 
bilateral foreign decree of divorce." Galvn v. Schwartz, 453 
N.Y.S.2d 624 (1982). Here, while the Separation Agreement was 
not merged with the Decree of Divorce, it was incorporated into 
it, just as the parties agreed it might be. (R: pg 11, 16) 
Therefore, Dr. Gillett is bound by its clear provisions, that he 
is to pay Ms. Gillett $800 each month until either party dies or 
she remarries. 
IV. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENTS WERE NEITHER UNCONSCIONABLE, 
NOR VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY, AND THEY SHOULD BE 
ENFORCED. 
Dr. Gillett apparently is claiming that the Separation 
Agreement, into which he entered with the advice of counsel, and 
for the purpose of enabling him to obtain a "quickie" Mexican 
divorce from his wife of thirty-two years, was unconscionable at 
the time he entered into it. His claim is unbelievable, given 
the facts on the record. At the time of the divorce, Dr. Gillett 
was a successful medical doctor, who wished to marry a younger 
woman, while Ms. Gillett was, by the doctor's own admission, a 
fifty-five year old woman without marketable skills. 
Amazingly, Dr. Gillett cites Christian v. Christian, 365 
N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1977) to support his position. That case, in 
all its particulars, supports Ms. Gillett1s position in this 
action. New York's highest court held in Christian that 
"generally, separation agreements which are regular on their face 
are binding on the parties unless and until they are put aside." 
3 65 N.E.2d at 855. At most, separation agreements are voidable. 
not void. Id. Here, neither the Separation Agreement nor the 
Amended Separation Agreement has been put aside, and Dr. Gillett 
is bound by them. Dr. Gillett unilaterally decided to reduce, 
and then terminate, payments to Ms. Gillett without seeking the 
permission of the Court to do so. 
Further, the Court in Christian stated: 
"Judicial review is to be exercised circumspectly, 
sparingly and with a persisting view to the 
encouragement of parties settling their own 
differences... Furthermore, when there has been 
full disclosure between the parties...and there 
has been an absence of inequitable conduct or 
other infirmity... courts should not intrude so as 
to redesign the bargain arrived at by the 
parties..." Id. 
The Court set forth the circumstances under which it would refuse 
to enforce a Separation Agreement as follows: 
"To warrant equity's intervention, no actual fraud 
need be shown, for relief will be granted if the 
settlement is manifestly unfair to a spouse 
because of the other's overreaching. In 
determining whether a separation agreement is 
invalid, courts may look at the terms of the 
agreement to see if there is an inference, or even 
a negative inference, of overreaching in its 
execution. If the execution of the agreement, 
however, be fair, no further inquiry will be 
made." 365 N.E.2d at 856. 
In this case, Dr. Gillett has alleged no facts which would 
indicate that Ms. Gillett overreached at the time the Separation 
Agreement was executed. The facts are quite to the contrary. 
Dr. Gillett was represented by counsel, while Ms. Gillett was 
without the assistance of counsel. Dr. Gillett was economically 
strong and independent, while Ms. Gillett was without job skills 
or work experience. If there was any overreaching here, it was 
done by Dr. Gillett, not Ms. Gillett. The Agreements should be 
enforced. 
The provisions of the Separation Agreement similarly do not 
violate Utah public policy. A women married to a successful 
medical doctor for thirty-two years, who was without marketable 
skills at the time of the divorce would likely be awarded 
permanent alimony in Utah, even today. See, for example, Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988). 
V. EVEN IF THE AGREEMENTS WERE AMBIGUOUS AS TO DURATION, 
APPELLANT HAS PROVIDED NO REASON FOR HIS REFUSAL TO 
SUPPORT RESPONDENT OTHER THAN A DISINCLINATION TO DO 
SO. 
Dr. Gillett argues that the Separation Agreement and the 
Amended Separation Agreement are ambiguous, in that they don't 
set forth a specific duration for his obligation to pay alimony 
to his former wife. Under the law, absent an agireement to the 
contrary, Dr. Gillett1s obligation continues until either party 
dies, Ms. Gillett remarries, or the Court relieves him of the 
future obligation to pay support. Unless Dr. Gillett shows good 
cause for a failure to seek invalidation of the Separation 
Agreement or modification of it, there can be no retroactive 
reduction of alimony. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 417 N.Y.S.2d 479, 
481 (App.Div.lst Dept. 1979); Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 
1079 (Utah 1977). 
Here, Dr. Gillett has never alleged any reason for failing 
to seek the Court's assistance. He merely decided to decrease 
his alimony payments. When Ms. Gillett sought the assistance of 
the Court, he punished her by stopping payment altogether, 
perhaps hoping that she would be unable to afford to assert her 
rights to alimony. The Court of Appeals should not permit Dr. 
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Gillett to continue to deprive Ms. Gillett, now seventy-two years 
old, of the support to which she is entitled and on which she has 
depended to enable her to avoid a poverty-stricken old age. 
VI. APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR SUMS ALLEGEDLY 
PAID TO RESPONDENT IN LIEU OF ALIMONY. 
Dr. Gillett claimed, for the first time, in his Motion for 
Amendment of Judgment or Relief from Order that he had made 
payments to Ms. Gillett in addition to the support payments under 
the Separation Agreements. It is undisputed that any such 
"additional" payments were made between 1970 and 1973. Dr. 
Gillett first mentioned them fifteen years later, in 1988. Even 
if such payments were made, which Ms. Gillett disputes, Dr. 
Gillett is not entitled to an offset as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, there is no material facts in dispute concerning the 
amount owed by Dr. Gillett to Ms. Gillett. 
Both Utah and New York law are clear that such payments, if 
they occurred, may not be credited against other amounts due and 
owing under a separation agreement or decree of divorce. Soltow 
v. Soltow, 364 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (App.Div.2d Dept. 1975); Home v. 
Home, 292 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415 (1968) ("The general rule (is) that 
payments made 'voluntarily and not pursuant to a divorce decree 
may not be credited by him against other amounts due and 
owing....1). See also Ross v. Ross, 592 P. 2d 600, 603 (Utah 
1979) . 
Such claims are barred by laches. Under New York law, 
alimony and support payments may be recovered for only six years. 
Tauber v. Lebow, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1985); Galvn v. Schwartz, 434 
N.Y.S.2d 1,3 (App.Div.lst Dept. 1980). See also Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-23. Dr. Gillett failed to make alimony 
payments to Ms. Gillett under the Separation Agreement in 1970, 
which payments she has never sought. (R: pg 127) Ms. Gillett 
cannot now seek an offset against any payments Dr. Gillett may 
have made on her behalf in 1970-1973. Accordingly, equity 
forbids the Court from permitting Dr. Gillett to claim credit for 
his payments, if he indeed made them. 
Further, the parties litigated the issue of arrearages in an 
action brought in 1975 in a New York court. If Dr. Gillett 
failed to raise a claim of offset in those proceedings, he is 
barred from doing so now. If the question was raised at that 
time and he was then granted such offset, he may not claim it 
again. 
Finally, even if there is a dispute as to amount of 
arrearages, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
that Dr. Gillett has a continuing obligation to pay alimony, and 
remand for further hearings on the amount presently owed. 
VII. APPELLANT BROUGHT THIS APPEAL ONLY TO DELAY PAYMENT OF 
THE SUMS AWARDED RESPONDENT, AND RESPONDENT SHOULD BE 
AWARDED THE FEES AND COSTS SHE INCURRED IN RESPONDING 
TO IT. 
Dr. Gillett has never pointed to a single statement in the 
Separation Agreement, Amended Separation Agreement, or Decree of 
Divorce which, under any reading, justifies his reduction or 
termination of alimony payments to Ms. Gillett. Yet, for nearly 
two and one half years, Dr. Gillett has delayed the inevitable, 
and increased Ms. Gillett1s costs by filing Memoranda and appeals 
with the most minimal legal basis. Under Rule 33(a) of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, this Court may award "just 
damages", and single or double costs. Ms. Gillett asks that she 
be awarded the attorneys' fees and costs she incurred since the 
inception of this action as damages, and be granted double her 
fees and costs in defending this appeal. 
Under New York law, she would be entitled to the fees and 
costs she incurred in enforcing this Separation Agreement, Galyn 
v. Schwartz, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 4. The Utah courts should do no 
less, particularly since she would likely recover these fees and 
costs if she were collecting arrearages under a Decree of Divorce 
rather than in a breach of contract action. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Monica Gillett, respectfully asks that the Utah 
Court of Appeals: 
1. Affirm the decision of the Third District Court, that 
Appellant, James Anthony Gillett, is bound by the clear 
provisions of the Amended Separation Agreement, and 
must pay alimony in the amount of $800 each month until 
the death of either party or remarriage of Ms. Gillett. 
2. Award Ms. Gillett all arrearages accrued to the time of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals on this matter, 
including interest, and either enter a Judgment in that 
amount or remand to the Third District Court with an 
order that it enter such a Judgment. 
3. Enter a Order for specific performance of the Amended 
Separation Agreement, or remand to the Third District 
Court with instructions that it enter such an Order. 
4. Award as damages to Ms. Gillett all fees and costs 
incurred by her since the inception of this action. 
5. Award Ms. Gillett double the fees and costs incurred in 
defending against Dr. Gillettfs appeal. 
6. Such other remedies as this Court finds just and 
reasonable. 
DATED this of January, 1989. 
JLA 
Louise T. Knauer 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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